This article analyzes the post-communist regime track record in comparative perspective and reevaluates the impact of modernization on the democratic prospects in developing countries. The analysis shows that ex-communist countries were less democratic than their socioeconomic development levels would have predicted, and that the development-democracy link was different than elsewhere, due to the distorted nature of communist development. The article then traces this democratic deficit to individual-level deficits in democratic attitudes and civic and political participation. Post-communist democratic prospects are further undermined by the fact that the participatory deficit is greater among the relatively prodemocratic middle class, than among the lower class, which had experienced mobilization from above under communism, but was less likely to subscribe to democratic values than lower classes in non-communist countries.
After years of relative neglect, 1 modernization theory has recently made an unexpected comeback as an explanation of cross-national regime patterns, as several statistically sophisticated approaches (e.g. Przeworski and Limongi 1997 , Barro 1999 , Boix and Stokes 2003 , Epstein et al 2006 have assessed the impact of socio-economic development on the initiation and survival of democracy. The post-communist regime transformations provide an interesting testing ground for modernization theory because the twenty-eight countries that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc shared important developmental legacies after almost five decades of communist rule but also displayed significant and consequential differences (Horowitz 2003 , Pop-Eleches 2007 . Moreover, the abrupt "Leninist extinction" (Jowitt 1992 ) meant that the timing of the transition away from communist one-party rule was fairly exogenous, in the sense that the threat of Soviet intervention to prop up Communist regimes was removed at roughly the same time for all the countries of the former Soviet bloc.
However, so far this theoretical promise has not been sufficiently fulfilled. Much of the cross-national statistical research on the drivers of democratization either used pre-1990 data (Przeworski and Limongi 1997 , Barro 1999 , Boix and Stokes 2003 and therefore obviously ignores the post-communist experience, or includes ex-communist countries as part of a global sample but does not explore the potential causal heterogeneity due to the inclusion of a set of countries with such unique economic and political development trajectories (Epstein et al 2006) . Meanwhile, much of the post-communist transition literature has tended to emphasize other aspects, such as initial elections and power balance (Fish 1998a , 1998b , McFaul 2002 or international factors (Whitehead 1996 , Kopstein and Reilly 2000 , Vachudova 2005 , while largely treating socio-economic development as control 1 After its heyday in the 1960s, modernization theory was increasingly criticized for its lack of credible mechanisms and by the late 1980s much of the debate focused on the role of more proximate factors in explaining the Third Wave of democratization (O'Donnell et al 1986; Di Palma 1990; Karl and Schmitter 1991 and Przeworski 1991) .
variables/rival hypotheses. Nonetheless, modernization theory has received some theoretical attention in analyses of the collapse of Communism (Lewin 1991 , Hosking 1991 , Hough 1997 ), and in a few studies of post-communist regime transformations (e.g. Vassilev 1999 , Kurtz and Barnes 2002 , Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006 , Pop-Eleches 2007 . However, the focus of these studies has largely been to explain regime trajectories within the former Soviet bloc (Kopstein 2003) , rather than to place the communist and post-communist experience in broader international perspective.
This article uses evidence from cross-national regime trajectories and public opinion data to analyze the post-communist regime track record in comparative perspective and to reevaluate the impact of social and economic modernization on the democratic prospects in developing countries. This analysis raises two important challenges to modernization theory and to the implicit assumption of earlier studies of a uniform link between socio-economic modernization and democracy: first, considering their fairly high levels of socio-economic development in 1990, the democratic performance of the ex-communist countries was surprisingly modest after 1990, and second, the relationship between traditional development indicators and democracy differs substantially between ex-communist and non-communist countries. 2 These findings suggest that in order to understand the development-democracy link, we need to account not only for the extent but also for the nature of socio-economic development.
To understand the reasons for the weaker-than-expected democratic impact of communist socio-economic modernization, I argue that we need to understand both the inherent distortions of such centrally planned development efforts and at the interaction between modernization and the political project of Communism. Thus, while communist 2 Interestingly, the surprising coexistence of high economic development and non-democracy among the Communist countries was noted by earlier analysts (e.g. Dahl 1971) but they generally expected that the communist regimes would not be able to maintain a "centrally dominated social order" in the long run and would therefore face inevitable political liberalization pressures (Dahl 1971:78) .
countries achieved decent economic growth and made impressive progress in promoting education and income equality, these processes did not create democratic constituencies along the lines that modernization theorists would have predicted. Drawing on cross-national survey data, I show that even after more than a decade since the fall of Communism, postcommunist citizens display important deficits in democratic attitudes and in civic and political participation. Even more importantly, citizens of ex-communist countries exhibit a problematic pattern of democratic values and political participation, which can be traced to the communist political system: thus, compared to its non-communist counterparts, the postcommunist middle class is no less democratic in its outlook but its members are significantly less likely to participate in the civic or political sphere. Meanwhile, the lower class, which had experienced mobilization from above under the communist regime, exhibited no such participatory deficit but it was significantly less likely to subscribe to democratic values than lower classes in non-communist countries.
The article is organized as follows: the next section provides a brief overview of the peculiarities of communist socio-economic development and places its achievements and limitations in comparative perspective. Next I present the findings of cross-national statistical tests of the drivers of democracy in the post-Cold War era to establish the magnitude of the post-communist democracy deficit and the extent to which this deficit can be explained by communist era developmental legacies.
In the final section I analyze cross-national survey evidence for both ex-communist and non-communist countries to test several hypotheses about the causal mechanisms linking communist developmental legacies and post-communist regime trajectories. In particular I test the extent to which post-communist citizens differ systematically along three dimensions with important implications for the prospects and quality of democracy: democratic values, civic involvement and political participation.
Communist modernization -achievements and limitations
Prior to the arrival of Communism, most Eurasian countries were hardly promising democratization candidates from a modernization standpoint: during the interwar period most of the region was poor, overwhelmingly rural (over 80%), on average half its population was illiterate and most East Europeans benefited from only the most rudimentary health and welfare benefits. Moreover, economic development was highly uneven within the region and these differences largely followed the familiar West-East/South gradient, from the fairly affluent, urbanized and highly educated Czech lands to the much poorer, illiterate and overwhelmingly rural Central Asia and Southern Balkans.
Even the harshest anti-communist critics would have a hard time denying that under communist rule most of the Soviet bloc -and particularly the initially underprivileged countries and regions -experienced rapid economic growth and modernization, especially during the first quarter-century after World War II (Janos 2000) . Even though the actual industrialization and modernization process entailed substantial short-term disruption and human suffering, it left behind a much more developed group of countries, which according to modernization theory should imply significantly improved post-communist democratization prospects compared to the prewar period. Thus, by 1989 in the average communist country 56% of the population lived in urban settings, welfare benefits had been extended to large parts of the population, and poverty had been significantly reduced, largely due to the region's low inequality levels. Educational achievements were even more impressive: by the late 1980s the Communists had virtually eradicated illiteracy throughout the former Soviet bloc and secondary education enrollments were significantly higher than in other developing countries. Therefore, from a straight-forward modernization theory perspective, Communist planners may have unwittingly paved the way for the collapse of Communism and subsequent democratization (Lewin 1991 , Vassilev 1999 .
On the other hand, even abstracting for now from the social and psychological implications of Communist-style coerced modernization, the developmental record of the Soviet bloc was far from ideal. Thus, the impressive economic growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s were followed by slowdown in the 1970s and stagnation in the 1980s, which was marked by increasing shortages and economic bottlenecks (Kornai 1992) . The exhaustion of communist developmental efforts is also illustrated by Figure 1 , which compares the overtime evolution of urbanization in prewar communist countries (the original Soviet republics and Mongolia), the post-war communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Latin American countries. Beyond the question about the extent of socio-economic progress, which will be analyzed in greater detail below, we need to consider the possibility that the coercive, centrally planned communist approach to development produced a different type of modernity, whose implications for democracy may differ substantially not only from early developers but also from non-communist late development in other parts of the developing world. Thus, the heavy emphasis on ideological indoctrination and technical subjects in communist education arguably affected its democratizing impact, while the coercive dual process of collectivization and industrialization created towns and cities whose inhabitants arguably had a different urban experience than their non-communist counterparts.
Unfortunately, such qualitative developmental differences are difficult to capture statistically, and will be analyzed indirectly through their impact on individual attitudes and behavior in the final section of the article. Table 2 include two indicators of interwar development, which control for pre-communist differences and provide a baseline for assessing communist-era performance. Since GDP/capita statistics for the pre-war era are notoriously difficult to compare cross-nationally, I collected data on urbanization 3 and literacy 4 in the mid 1920s. 5 In addition, the regressions included a series of regional dummies. Table 2 here
The results of the (admittedly reduced form) regressions in Table 2 is at least partially due to the region's lower pre-communist economic starting points (which are only imperfectly captured by the urbanization and literacy controls), the much greater energy intensity of Soviet-style economies (model 5) cannot be blamed as readily on precommunist legacies.
Overall, the analysis in this section has presented a mixed and highly uneven picture of communist modernization performance: the countries of the former Soviet bloc entered the post-Cold War era with a significant advantage in terms of education and economic equality, which from a modernization theory standpoint should facilitate democratization through greater civil society involvement and political participation. At the same time, however, Communism did not help these countries overcome their deficit in terms of urbanization and wealth, which weakened their democratic prospects from a modernization theory perspective.
Beyond the standard question about how much development occurred under Communism (or any other system), I argue that we need to understand better what kind of development it was. Therefore, the question to be addressed in the following section is not just whether the regime trajectories of ex-communist countries differed because they were more or less developed than other countries at the outset of the transition but also whether the link between development and regime type differed for the ex-communist countries, given the particularities of their modernization paths and methods over five or more decades.
Non-democratizing development: assessing the regime legacies of Communism
Even though the ex-communist countries faced significant challenges at the outset of their simultaneous economic and political transitions, they nevertheless benefited from several favorable conditions, which explain the democratic optimism of the early 1990s.
Since Communism had been imposed by Soviet troops for most countries in the region, the removal of the Soviet threat combined with the ideological dominance of Western liberalism produced a widely shared assumption (embodied in the very notion of transition) that the endpoint of the post-communist transformations would be some form of democratic politics and market-based economics. While not everybody shared this initial optimism (Jowitt 1992) , even observers concerned with domestic preconditions had at least some reasons to be optimistic, given the significant advantages with respect to education and inequality, which were discussed in the previous section. Indeed, several prominent explanations of the decline and collapse of Soviet communism (Remington 1990 , Lewin 1991 , Bahry 1993 , Hough 1997 ) confirmed earlier predictions by modernization theorists that Soviet totalitarianism would ultimately be undermined by the very socio-economic transformations it had triggered (Deutsch 1953 , Parsons 1967 . This argument was extended to post-communist democratization by Vassilev's (1999) Table 3 is the combined level of civil liberties and political rights according to Freedom House in a given country and year. 7 The main independent variables of interest are a series of dummy indicators capturing different types of ex-communist regimes, and several socio-economic development indicators, which will be discussed in greater detail below. In addition, the regression models include indicators intended to capture several classical explanations of regime patterns, including ethnic fractionalization, natural resource dependence, the presence of violent conflict, as well as a series of standard controls such as population size, regional dummies and a year variable intended to capture temporal democracy trends.
8 Table 3 here
The first two models in Table 3 represent baseline regressions against which subsequent models can be compared: model 1 only includes regional dummies and the year variable, and identifies a substantively large and statistically significant democracy deficit among the 28 Eurasian transition countries if we ignore any alternative drivers of democracy except for regional effects. By contrast, model 2 presents a more completely specified model of regime outcomes but in line with the standard approach used in cross-national regression analyses of democratization, it does not include an indicator for whether a country was excommunist. Overall, the regression provides solid support for the main modernization theory predictions, given that richer, more urbanized countries with more educated populations were significantly more likely to be democratic in the post-Cold War period. The results also confirm the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization and violent conflict, which emerged as 6 I used Prais-Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard errors and correct for serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 7 I obtained similar results using Polity regime scores and Vanhanen's polyarchy indicator, but the results are omitted here due to space considerations. 8 For a more detailed description of the variables used in the regressions, see Table 1 in the Appendix.
statistically significant negative predictors of democracy. The only unexpected result was the statistically significant positive effect of income inequality.
Model 3 simply adds the Eurasian transition country dummy from model 1 to the battery of traditional democracy correlates from model 2. While the overall explanatory power of the model does not increase dramatically, the results in model 3 confirm the large and statistically significant democracy handicap of ex-communist countries even after the collapse of Communism: thus, once we control for developmental differences, transition countries had a 3.3 point deficit on the 12 point FH democracy scale compared to their noncommunist counterparts, and this effect was actually somewhat larger than in model 1. 9 Even more importantly, the inclusion of the post-communism dummy significantly affected the size, significance and even the direction of several developmental and structural variables, which suggests that that its omission in most democratization studies arguably leads to biased estimates. For example, compared to the baseline in model 2, the magnitude of the GDP/capita effect was reduced by almost 80% (and was no longer statistically significant), the impact of secondary education enrollment increased by a third, the income inequality effect was reversed and now pointed in the expected direction, whereas ethnic fractionalization was a substantively larger and marginally statistically significant impediment to democracy.
The causal heterogeneity suggested by the difference between models 2 and 3 is explored in greater detail in model 4, which adds interaction terms between the postcommunism dummy and several developmental indicators. This approach allows us to test not only whether ex-communist countries underperformed relative to their developmental legacies but also whether the impact of different aspects of modernization varies between ex-communist and non-communist countries. The interaction effects in model 4 provide strong evidence that this is indeed the case: thus, GDP/capita had a large and significant positive effect on non-communist countries, but the effect was completely erased among the transition countries, perhaps due to the problematic nature of communist output statistics (Aslund 2001) . On the other hand, urbanization had a strong positive effect on post-communist democracy but was weakly negative elsewhere, a finding that is somewhat surprising given the problematic nature of communist urbanization. 10 With respect to the greatest developmental achievement of Communism -the widespread educational progress -the results in model 4 suggest that more widespread secondary education enrollment was associated with greater democracy only among non-communist countries. In other words, it appears that despite its quantitative achievements, something about the nature of communist education prevented its citizens from using this empowerment for democratic purposes after the collapse of Communism.
While the analysis so far has focused on the twenty-eight ex-communist countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, 11 which started their political transition in 1989-91 and are typically grouped together by analyses of post-communism, such a classification ignores significant differences within this group. Therefore, in model 5 I differentiate between countries, which belonged to the pre-WWII Soviet Union, and East European countries that came under Communist after World War II, and were therefore spared the harrowing experience of the first two decades of Stalinism. The results in model 5 confirm the analytical utility of this distinction, given that the democracy deficit of the original Soviet republics was much larger in both substantive and statistical terms. Thus, in line with theoretical expectations, it appears that the countries that received the longest and strongest "dose" of 10 One possible explanation is that Communist cities may have integrated its inhabitants to a greater extent in urban life that the large slums of many developing country metropolitan areas -however, this is merely a conjecture and deserves greater attention in future research. 11 This group includes 12 East European countries (but not newly independent Montenegro, for which little data is available), the 15 former Soviet republics and Mongolia.
communist modernization also suffered the greatest post-communist democratization obstacles. On the other hand, it is worthwhile noting that even their more fortunate East European neighbors still under-performed in democratic terms after the collapse of communism, which suggests that the developmental legacies of communism were not immediately overcome by the hopes of returning to Europe.
Since the universe of (ex)communist regimes obviously extends beyond Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, the next two models test the regime impact of communism beyond the Eurasian core countries. Thus, the communist regime indicator in model 6 also includes other countries ruled by Communist regimes for at least 30 years, and therefore includes Cuba, China and a number of other Asian countries. Not surprisingly, the inclusion of these long-term communist regimes produces results that are broadly comparable to model 3, arguably because the limited democratic progress in these countries was partially balanced by their greater relative socio-economic backwardness. Finally, in line with recent discussions about the need to expand the universe of ex-communist countries (Chen and Sil 2007), model 7 uses an even broader definition by including other developing countries (such as Tanzania, Angola and Afghanistan) which were ruled by Marxist one-party regimes at some point before 1990. While still substantively important and statistically significant, the democracy deficit for this maximalist definition of communist regimes is somewhat smaller than for longer-term communist dictatorships, arguably reflecting the weaker intensity and shorter duration of communist modernization efforts in these countries.
Explaining non-democratic communist development
How can we explain the remarkable democratic deficit of the former communist countries, which has been revealed by the analysis so far? What are the theoretical implications of this post-communist exceptionalism for our understanding of the development-democracy link? In the final section of the article I will turn to cross-national survey evidence in order to explore some of the potential mechanisms that account for the relative disconnect between the respectable "quantitative" developmental record of communism and the disappointing democratic performance of ex-communist countries.
The recent colored revolutions in Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan provide a useful starting point for this discussion, since they have once more focused public and scholarly attention on the crucial role of civil society organizations in challenging authoritarian regimes. Whereas earlier studies of post-communist civil society had noted a significant participatory deficit (Howard 2002 (Howard , 2003 , this perspective was questioned by the central role played by civic youth organizations such as Otpor in Serbia, Kmara in Georgia, Pora in the Ukraine, and (to a lesser extent) KelKel in Kyrgyzstan in launching a second wave of post-communist revolutions. Combined with the spectacle of tens or hundreds of thousands of protesters challenging authoritarian regimes in successive days of largely peaceful demonstrations, these groups served as a vivid reminder of the remarkable political power, which can be wielded by even a small network of determined civil society activists if they manage to mobilize a critical mass of ordinary citizens against the authoritarian regime.
However, following the initial euphoria, the enthusiasm for civil society promotion has significantly abated for a number of reasons: first, the subsequent failure of similar mobilization efforts in Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia has shown that such activist networks are limited in their ability to promote political change unless they can mobilize a more substantial part of the population, especially when facing harsher authoritarian regimes. Second, Putin's ability to "hijack" the idea and set up a very effective counter-revolutionary youth movement, Nashi, serves as an important reminder that civil society and political mobilization are not inherently democratizing if participants are mobilized for non-democratic purposes. 12 Finally, the fairly disappointing democratization progress in the "successful" revolutionary cases, especially Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine (Beissinger 2006) suggests that while popular mobilization spikes may be necessary for overthrowing authoritarian rulers, they are not necessarily sufficient for ensuring the longerterm success of democracy.
Therefore, my analysis in this section will focus on the question of how communist Table B in the appendix.
For the regressions presented in this version of the article I present robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level. This approach adjusts standard errors in order to account for the fact that the macro-variables, such as economic performance and governance differ across country-years but are constant for all respondents in a given survey. 14 Moreover, all the regressions and summary statistics use equilibrated WVS survey weights, which combine any within-country survey weights with a cross-country component that adjusts for sample size differences across countries.
As a first step, let us examine the impact of communist legacies on the four dimensions of political attitudes and behavior. Following Bernhard and Karakoc (2007) , as an 14 I get very similar results using hierarchical linear models in HLM 6.0 to account for the multi-level nature of the data. However, HLM does not allow for negative binomial regressions, and has difficulties running ordered probit models with large numbers of categories, which is why I opted for the present approach.
indicator of civic participation, in model 1 I used a count variable of the number of different types of voluntary organizations (ranging from sports to churches and human rights groups)
to which a given respondent claimed to belong. 15 To measure political activity, I used an index, which, following Dalton and Vansickle (2006) and Bernhard and Karakoc (2007) , assigns a score of 1 for demonstrations, 2 for boycotts and strikes and 3 for occupying buildings, resulting in a 0-8 political participation score. 16 To assess democratic attitudes, I
created a standardized democracy index based on seven WVS survey questions, 17 which asked respondents to evaluate different statements about democracy and alternative ways of ruling the country (see appendix for question wording). Finally, to measure the salience of democracy I used two WVS questions which asked respondents to identify priorities for their countries, and created a six-point scale based on how highly individuals ranked democracyrelated objectives such as free speech and greater input.
The regressions in Table 4 include several relevant individual-level characteristics, including dummies for tertiary and secondary education, age, gender, religion and income.
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In line with the earlier discussion about the impact of modernization, I collected two development indicators (GDP/capita and income inequality) for each of the almost 180 country-year pairings in which a WVS survey occurred. To account for the possibility that post-communist political attitudes and mobilization may have been shaped by the depth of the economic crises experienced by many transition countries, I included controls for shortterm economic conditions (inflation and growth in the preceding two years). To avoid reverse causation concerns, these indicators are lagged by one year.
15 I also considered alternative measures such as a simple dichotomous indicator denoting whether or not a given individual belonged to any of the fifteen types of organizations, or an indicator of whether or not an individual performed unpaid work for any voluntary organization, but the results were broadly comparable and are omitted here due to space considerations. 16 I obtained similar results when using a dichotomous indicator denoting whether or not a respondent had participated in any of the following five political actions: signing a petition, participating in a lawful demonstration, joining a boycott, participating in unofficial strikes and occupying buildings/factories. 17 Cronbach's alpha for the index was .73, which is quite reasonable for this type of survey questions. 18 Since town size was missing for a surprisingly large number of surveys and did not produce strong results it is omitted from the current specifications. Germany. Unlike them, however, I do not include these countries in the same "posttotalitarian" category with ex-communist countries, both because communist and fascist regimes differed in their developmental and repressive strategies, and -more importantlybecause the totalitarian experience of the former was significantly shorter and lies almost two generations behind, which should affect its present-day implications. Table 4 here
The first two models in Table 4 suggest that ex-communist countries had a significant deficit with respect to both civic involvement and political participation not only compared to older democracies (the excluded category) but even compared to their non-communist exauthoritarian/totalitarian counterparts. These differences confirm the fact that the demobilizing experience of communism was deeper than that of other non-democratic regimes, and justify the separate treatment of communist and non-communist ex-totalitarian regimes. Moreover, there seems to be little evidence that this organizational deficit has declined over the course of the post-communist transition despite the removal (or at least weakening) of state restrictions on civic and political participation.
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The civic and political participation differences between East European and ex-Soviet citizens tell a somewhat more complicated picture. On the one hand, the civic participation deficit was substantively larger in the Soviet republics that had experienced an additional three decades of Communism compared to their East European "comrades." On the other hand, the patterns are somewhat more surprising for political activism, where the participatory deficit was both substantively larger and statistically stronger than in the former Soviet republics.
The citizens of ex-communist countries were not only more passive than their noncommunist counterparts but they had a much more ambivalent relationship towards democracy. Thus, ex-communists -and particularly respondents from the interwar former The substantively large and statistically significant negative interaction effect in model 5
confirms that the post-communist democracy deficit is due not only to lower mobilization
and democratic values but due to the fact that the "wrong" people are mobilized. As illustrated in Figure 2 , which plots the predicted levels of political activity for different levels of democratic support based on the regression finding in model 5, in non-communist countries democrats tend to be much more politically active than non-democrats, but the effect is much weaker in ex-communist countries.
Figure 2 here
Conversely, when analyzing the extent of the post-communist political action deficit, we find that among strong democrats (with democratic index scores above the 90 th percentile) the deficit is large and statistically significant, whereas for anti-democrats (with democratic index scores below the 10 th percentile) the deficit completely disappears. In other words, in ex-communist countries it is only the democrats but not the anti-democrats who are less politically active than elsewhere in the world, which means that the mix of democratic values among politically mobilized citizens in post-communist countries is even more unfavorable compared to the rest of the world than in the population at large.
To make sure that these results were not driven by a few outlier countries, I followed the method proposed by Jusko and Shively (2005) and ran separate regressions for each country-year survey included in the analysis in model 5 of Table 4 . The coefficients of these ordered probit regressions, which included the same individual-level controls as the regression in model 5, are plotted in Figure 3 by survey year. As Figure 3 illustrates, the coefficients for the ex-communist countries consistently cluster in the lower range of the graph, and there is no evidence that the results are driven by a few outliers with particularly skewed patterns of political mobilization and democratic values. and Southern Europe). While communist regimes eventually produced their own intelligentsia and middle classes, these social groups arguably had much fewer opportunities for independent civic and political participation. Therefore, we would expect post-communist elite and middle class to suffer from a greater mobilizational disadvantage than other social groups.
The second relevant aspect of communist developmental strategies is the fact that even though they fell short of achieving Marx's ideal of the dictatorship of the proletariat, communist regimes nevertheless engaged in significant efforts to mobilize the lower classes.
Even if much of that mobilization was controlled from above and therefore usually While a more detailed analysis of the different evaluations of the past in ex-communist vs.
other ex-authoritarian countries is beyond the scope of the current discussion, this claim is strongly supported by survey evidence. Thus, I compared the answers of poor vs. rich respondents to a survey question that asked them to rate the old regime on a scale from 1-10:
in ex-communist countries the average evaluation for poor respondents was 5.24 while for rich respondents it was 4.29, whereas in non-communist ex-authoritarian countries the pattern was reversed (4.74 for the poor and 5.28 for the rich). Therefore, we may expect a weaker support for democracy among lower-class post-communist citizens compared to low-income, low-education groups elsewhere in the world.
To test these hypotheses empirically, models 6-9 in table 4 focus on the same four dependent variables as models 1-4 but include interaction terms between the postcommunism indicator and the two aspects of development -wealth and education -which the earlier cross-national statistical analysis had identified as areas of development from which ex-communist countries received a weaker "democracy dividend" than other countries.
All the other control variables are the same as in the earlier analysis. Given the presence of interaction terms, the coefficient for ex-communist countries now only reflects the behavior and attitudes of low-income and low-education citizens in ex-communist countries, whereas the effects for other groups have to be calculated on the basis of both the main coefficient and the interaction terms.
The statistical results in models 6-9 broadly confirm the hypotheses derived above on the basis of the political logic of communist development, but they also provide some interesting nuances about the different facets of mobilization and democratic values. Thus, models 6&7 reveal different socio-economic patterns of mobilization depending on whether we focus on civic or political engagement. In line with the predictions of the "different developmental trajectories" theory discussed above, model 7 suggests that poor and uneducated ex-communists do not suffer from a political activity deficit compared to their non-communist counterparts. However, the negative and statistically significant interactions effects between the post-communism indicator and the income and higher education variables, suggests that this deficit was much greater among highly educated and relatively well-off individuals. Conversely, while higher education and income were associated with greater political activism in all countries, the effect was weaker in ex-communist countries than elsewhere, especially with respect to income.
By comparison, the large negative effect of the main ex-communist indicator in model 6, combined with the weak statistical significance of the interaction effects, suggests that the civic participation deficit of ex-communist citizens seems to apply fairly uniformly across different social groups. Meanwhile, given that the effects of higher education and income are large and comparable across ex-communist and non-communist countries, this finding suggests that ex-communist middle classes derived similar civic participation boosts as their counterparts elsewhere.
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In terms of professed support for democratic values, model 8 confirms that the most pronounced post-communist deficit occurred for the least educated citizens, which were significantly less supportive of democracy than their non-communist counterparts.
Meanwhile, the positive and statistically significant effect of the interaction terms with secondary and tertiary education suggests that this democracy gap is reduced by greater education, and virtually disappears for the most educated groups. Overall, the findings in this section offer an attitudinal and behavioral basis for the democratic ineffectiveness of communist developmental progress revealed by the crossnational country-level analysis, and they provide a mechanism for the weaker correlation between mobilization and democratic values in ex-communist countries. The problem appears to be two-fold: first, even though post-communist middle classes professed democratic values roughly in line with international standards, their low willingness to make 22 However, when using OLS instead of negative binomial regression, I find strong negative interactions between education and the post-communism dummy, which is in line with the hypothesis that the civic participation deficit should be greater for more educated ex-communists. 23 Notice, however, that the effect points in the opposite direction for income, with an (albeit modest) increase in the democratic support gap among the wealthier ex-communists.
further democratization a high political priority and their low relative political involvement made them much more ineffective promoters of democracy than their non-communist counterparts. Second, poorer and less educated ex-communists were as politically mobilized as the lower classes in other countries, but their significantly weaker endorsement of democratic values arguably meant that they were as likely to be mobilized for nondemocratic as for democratic purposes. As a result ex-communist countries seem to be characterized by a combination of a vaguely democratic but passive middle class and a lower class whose democratic ambivalence and greater relative mobilization can be -and has been -used by would-be authoritarian leaders.
Conclusion and implications
This article has started from the empirical puzzle and theoretical challenge posed by the disappointing post-communist regime trajectories of the countries of the former Soviet bloc. From a modernization theory perspective, this surprisingly weak performance is at odds with the widespread (and at least partially justified) perception that despite their problematic "methods," communists were actually quite effective in modernizing the societies over which they ruled. The comparative evaluation of communist developmental achievements in the first part of the article revealed a highly uneven track record, whereby strong achievements in education and income equality were balanced by more modest progress in economic development and considerably higher economic distortions.
The analysis of cross-national regime patterns in the second part of the article suggests that ex-communist countries stood out not only with respect to their peculiar mix of developmental strengths and weaknesses but in the nature of the link between various development aspects and democracy. In particular, the much weaker democratizing effects of education and wealth in ex-communist countries question the implicit assumption of causal homogeneity of many earlier studies of the development-democracy link and emphasize the need to pay closer attention to the nature of development not only to the "amount of development."
Finally, this post-communist exceptionalism reinforces the need for a more careful discussion of the mechanisms through which socio-economic modernization can bring about democratic change. Therefore, the last part of this article has analyzed the political attitudes and behavior of ex-communist citizens in comparative perspective, and has identified significant participatory and democratic value deficits. Even more importantly, I have shown that post-communist countries seem to suffer from a more problematic alignment between democratic values and mobilization in the sense that the proportion of non-democrats among the politically mobilized population is higher in former communist countries than elsewhere.
The final part of the analysis has suggested that these peculiarities can be traced to the developmental legacies of communist regimes, which demobilized the middle class while at .70 Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses # significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Note: Also included but not reported were region dummies, a year variable, and dummies indicating missing values for independent variables. Table D -WVS question wording  Indicator  Survey question wording 
